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This study examines citizens’ perceptions of fairness and legitimacy in political advertising. Using focus groups, an
original national survey, and data on election 2000, as well as drawing on results from a replication of the national
survey in 2004, we characterize political ads from the citizen’s perspective. We then turn to the impact of
‘‘negative’’ advertising on voter turnout. Like several studies, we find circumstances under which turnout can be
increased by negative ad criticisms. However, we show that this general result is only part of the story. Drawing on
research in political psychology, we suggest that voters are ‘‘motivated processors’’ of advertising claims; as such,
they evaluate the fairness of an ad according to their partisan predispositions. We show that when partisans
perceive the criticisms of their own party’s candidate to be fair, they are less likely to say they will vote. As a result,
we find that negative advertising not only may affect the total turnout in an election but also has an important and
varying impact on the composition of the electorate.
H
ow does ‘‘negative’’ campaign advertising
affect the American electorate? In recent
years the impact of negative ads has been
the subject of a great debate fueled by diverse
methodologies and equally diverse answers. Political
scientists and pundits have been especially alarmed by
suggestions that negative ads may affect partisans and
independents differently, depressing turnout for the
latter, while stimulating turnout of the former.
Concerns about the influence of political advertising,
including misgivings about the increase and impact of
negative campaign ads, are a subset of two more
general issues confronting the American polity: wor-
ries about declining participation in elections and the
prospect of an increasingly polarized electorate. Given
perceptions of the high stakes and close contests of the
2000 and 2004 presidential elections, the precise
composition of the electorate at the polls is also of
critical interest. Our research offers new evidence
about how voters characterize ‘‘negative’’ or ‘‘attack’’
ads and, in light of these characterizations, how
negative ads affect electoral participation, polariza-
tion, and composition. We demonstrate that voters’
partisanship substantially colors perceptions of legit-
imate negativity in advertising and that these char-
acterizations in turn affect who goes to the polls. As a
consequence, some negative advertising campaigns
may stimulate while others depress overall turnout,
but more than the total turnout is at stake. Negative
advertising also affects the composition of the elec-
torate since partisans and independents experience an
advertising stimulus (or deterrent) differently.
Electoral campaigns are increasingly ‘‘going neg-
ative’’ as Geer (2006), among others, has documented.
In the decade since Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995)
published findings showing that negative advertising
depressed voter turnout, especially among Independ-
ents, other scholars have criticized their methodology
(Bartels 1996; Brooks 2006) and reported different
effects. Finkel and Geer (1998) found no evidence of
demobilization of Independents from negative ads.
Lau and Pomper (2000, 2001) found that effects on
Independents varied with the amount of negative ad-
vertising exposure: Independents who were exposed
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to a campaign which contained a moderate amount
of negative ads showed no statistically significant evi-
dence of such an influence, but exposure to high levels
of negative advertising—negativism above 90% (an
amount that was higher than their actual campaign
observation)—was significantly related to a decline in
predicted voter turnout for Independents. Among par-
tisans, their work showed, higher levels of ad neg-
ativity were associated with an increase in predicted
turnout.
Several studies have concentrated on refining the
classification of ads rather than focusing singly on the
effect ‘‘negative’’ ads may have on partisans and in-
dependents. Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (1991),
Bartels and Vavreck (2000), and Kahn and Kenney
(1999) have demonstrated voters’ ability to distin-
guish ‘‘negative’’ ads, whose exceptionally harsh style
or tone, distortion of facts, or use of personal attacks
seem to cross the line, from ‘‘contrast’’ ads that offer
a legitimate critique of an opponent’s policy stands,
qualifications, or other substantive information.
[0]Similarly, Sigelman and Kugler (2003) showed
considerable variance in citizens’ perceptions of the
tone of campaigns. Freedman and Lawton (2000)
demonstrated that Independents viewed unfair
charges from one candidate, followed by similar
responses from the opponent, as particularly objec-
tionable. Following these advances, Jamieson (2000)
examined the different effects produced by ‘‘attack’’
and ‘‘contrast’’ ads on overall predicted turnout. She
[0]reported not only a decrease in predicted turnout
associated with exposure to highly negative attack ads
but also a reduction in the sponsoring candidate’s
vote share (Jamieson 2000, 112). However, her work
also showed that contrast ads, even when critical of an
opponent, increase both turnout and the sponsoring
candidate’s vote share. Geer (2006) and Goldstein
and Freedman (2002a, 2002b) similarly demonstrated
that ads with negative information about an oppo-
nent can inform voters and stimulate turnout among
partisans, while Geer also found that such ‘‘negative’’
ads can be a relatively good source of campaign
information. Taken together, studies distinguishing
either among advertising types or between partisans
and independents demonstrate the importance of clas-
sifying ads more carefully as a first step in evaluating
their differential effects on a segment of the electorate.
Such findings have refined conventional wisdom
about the general relationship between partisans and
campaign communications articulated by Kahn and
Kenny: ‘‘People with strong connections to the
political world participate in elections, regardless of
the tenor of campaigns’’ . . . [they are] ‘‘unaffected
by the negativity of campaigns’’ (1999, 885, 887).
Identifiers with a major party, who may be assumed
to have greater interest and knowledge of politics, are
thus seen as being more certain about their intentions
to vote and vote choices—and to tolerate the cross
current of campaign criticism to a greater extent.
Kahn and Kenny also found that Independents, who
may have less interest and knowledge about politics,
are more likely to vote as the proportion of critical
information in the candidates’ ads increases—but
only if they view the criticism as reasonable. Voters
are capable of making such distinctions, and if
reasonable criticism is presented in a stimulating
way, Independents may also respond with an in-
creased intention to vote. But they find that turnout
declines when ‘‘uncivil and inappropriate mudsling-
ing’’ occurs (Kahn and Kenney 1999).
Goldstein and Freedman have summarized the
state of research on this topic: ‘‘despite the substantial
attention the subject has drawn, there is still consid-
erable debate as to how, to what extent, and under
what conditions advertising matters’’ (2002b, 24),
suggesting that we must ‘‘look more closely at how
ads are perceived by actual voters’’ (2002a, 736). We
took this charge seriously. We examine citizens’
distinctions between fair and unfair charges raised
in election ad campaigns, asking how these percep-
tions relate to partisanship and, ultimately, how they
influence vote intentions. We go beyond studies of
negative advertising that do not distinguish among
responses of partisan subgroups to show that citizens
do differentiate types of negativity and that partisans’
characterizations of ‘‘negativity’’ are driven less by
the content than the source of an ad. Partisans apply
generous bounds of fairness to charges from their own
candidate but are highly sensitive to criticism leveled
at their candidate. The effects on voting are thus more
complex than previous research has allowed.1
Theory
Work in social and political psychology (e.g., Fischle
2000; Goren 2002; Sherif and Sherif 1967) suggests
that partisans are motivated information processors
1Sigelman and Kugler (2003) also examine how ordinary citizens
perceive advertising. Our findings and approach differ in three
important ways: (1) our focus on the perceived legitimacy as well
as the tone of ads, (2) our finding that partisans, who are less
likely to characterize a given ad as ‘‘negative,’’ apply their criteria
of fairness to evaluations of ads asymmetrically, and (3) by
considering the potential effects of perceptions of advertising on
vote intention.
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who exhibit predictable biases in managing informa-
tion. Strong beliefs often lead to biased memory
searches, biased choice of inferential heuristics, and
a predisposition to judge arguments supporting
existing beliefs to be accurate and to discount con-
trary arguments (Kunda 1999; Lodge and Taber 2000;
Redlawsk 2002).
More recent research by Westen et al. (2006) at
Emory University used functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) technology to show that when
partisans were presented with information threat-
ening their beliefs about their preferred candidate or
an opposition candidate, they reached biased con-
clusions, with the fMRI showing their effort to reach
an ‘‘emotionally stable judgment’’ through confirma-
tion bias to have involved primarily the part of the
brain associated with processing emotions. The re-
gion of the brain that involves reasoning remained
quiescent. The fMRI also showed that once these
biased conclusions were in place, the region of the
brain associated with reward or relief was activated,
suggesting that motivated judgments are doubly
reinforcing, rewarding the return to emotional equi-
librium while also avoiding the emotionally averse
information. The authors note that various methods
of escaping from aversive information, including
threats to one’s beliefs about a candidate for political
office (e.g., through denial, rationalization, and mo-
tivated distortion) have been associated with dop-
amine release.
Despite the obvious power of motivated infor-
mation processing by partisans, however, people’s
capacity to believe what they want to believe is
‘‘constrained by their ability to construct seemingly
reasonable justifications for these conclusions;’’ there
is a ‘‘trade-off between one’s desire to know the truth
and the desire to arrive at conclusions that sit
comfortably with one’s prior beliefs’’ (Fischle 2000,
137–38; Kunda 1990, 480). Willful ignorance may not
always bring bliss.
The latter insight fits well with recent theoretical
work on affective components in political choice
(Brader 2006; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000).
This research suggests that partisans usually regard
criticisms of an opponent by a candidate they sup-
port as expected and confirmatory—and they are
unlikely to scrutinize such claims closely. Criticisms
of a partisan’s own candidate can prompt two very
different responses, however. Usually, they will be
seen as routine and expected, resulting in a reliance
on partisan habit and the rejection of the claim. But if
criticism of a partisan’s candidate arouses anxiety
because the criticism is seen as fair and legitimate
or because the opponent’s rhetoric is seen as strik-
ingly unfair, then there is a dramatically different
response: ‘‘When the threat/surveillance response is
activated we find a close and demonstrable link to
higher levels of active calculation, the questioning of
existing behavioral patterns’’ (Neuman et al. 1997, 8).
Information that seems to ‘‘fit’’ may be hard to
ignore.
How might motivated information processing
affect partisan responses to ‘‘negative’’ advertising?
We hypothesize that rather than exhibiting a con-
sistently greater tolerance for negative campaign
claims, as the literature currently states, partisans will
vary in their reactions in distinct and predictable
ways; it depends on whether a partisan’s own
candidate is targeted and whether the claims are seen
as fair or not. As a result, partisans’ varying responses
to negative ad claims will have a differential impact
on the level of turnout—and on the composition of
the electorate.2
Research Design
We used multiple methods to test our theory. For the
first stage of our research we conducted seven 2-hour
focus groups, ranging in size from six to 12 subjects,
in Minnesota during the 2000 election. Protocols
dealt with media coverage of the election, with a
special focus on televised campaign ads (see the on-
line appendix at http://journalofpolitics.org/articles.
html). We asked subjects to talk about how they
experienced campaign advertising as they viewed
negative or ‘‘oppositional,’’ positive or ‘‘advocacy,’’
and contrast/comparative ads (Bartels and Vavreck
2000; Jamieson 2000; Lau and Pomper 2001) taken
from the presidential, U.S. Senate, and House races
that aired in Minnesota in 2000. The focus groups
offered an in-depth view of citizens’ responses and
provided a foundation for the national survey we
subsequently conducted. Comments by subjects in
two focus groups sum up well a principal response on
the fairness issue, illustrating our main theoretical
points and presaging a central finding from our
survey. In an October 18 group, a respondent,
Margit, commented on a harshly negative ad from
2This is not equivalent to the truism that ‘‘partisans view
exchanges through partisan lenses.’’ The truism generally refers
only to persuasion and, thus, says nothing about how partisan
lenses influence the processing of information from ads and what
behavioral effects may follow.
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a U.S. Senate race in Minnesota containing
distorted video:
‘‘And you know, I think there’s a difference between
criticizing someone’s record, which I think is perfectly
legitimate, and then saying what you yourself would do
instead . . . ; that’s legitimate and to me, it’s not neg-
ative, it’s simply scrutinizing the situation. What I
resent here is this implication that Mark Dayton is
untrustworthy, that there’s something flawed about his
character. That’s when criticizing someone’s record
becomes negative in a sinister sort of way, and that’s
when you really attack the person’s integrity,
honesty . . . .’’
An October 11 focus group included this ex-
change and sequence of comments on other ads from
the same source, which clearly illustrate an anxiety
response. One comment also illustrates how the ‘‘ac-
tual voters’’ Goldstein and Freedman refer to reason
from circumstances in their own lives to political
judgment:
MARY: ‘‘I’ve been turned off lately by Senator Rod
Grams’s ads. They’re so negative.’’
DICK: ‘‘The thing that’s disturbing about his ads is he
shows Mark Dayton and sort of distorts how he
looks . . . I mean, not that I agree with Mark Dayton,
but I think that’s an unfair ad.’’
JEANNE E.: ‘‘Now, in his new one, the people are all
green . . . ’’
JOHN: ‘‘I want to go up and adjust the set.’’
MARY: ‘‘He’s been there almost six years; I would think
he’d do more of his ads on what he’s done.’’
DICK: ‘‘It’s causing me to reconsider him. I’m sort of
for Grams, but I don’t know if I want to vote for him.’’
DUANE: ‘‘It tends to make me reconsider. In the
business I’m in, when we get together, if somebody
has something they want to add, to work towards a
problem, that’s useful. But for somebody to sit there
and tear a project down, but not give their positive
opinion or how they’re going to do it, that doesn’t help
anybody. So that ad does nothing for me – except
change my opinion about Grams.’’
Although focus group methodology does not
allow statistical generalization, the data derived from
the group discussion offer deeper insight into issues,
enabling us to see how citizens can articulate rich,
nuanced perspectives about ad communications.
Such enhanced understandings of what citizens think
may be used to inform survey questions that provide
data for statistical analysis. The detailed character-
izations of ads by our focus group subjects represented
responses to video and verbal stimuli from congres-
sional as well as presidential spots, suggesting that their
evaluations and classifications of ads may transcend a
particular electoral context. When we later presented
our survey subjects with the text of specific charges
from campaign ads, we found that by simulating the
stimulus materials used in the focus groups we
obtained similarly detailed responses from our survey
respondents. As a result, we can report correspond-
ingly rich responses from our survey respondents and
gain the benefits of generalizable survey data.
After identifying patterns in the discussions of
the focus group participants, we entered the second
stage of our research in which we distilled the
comments and language from the groups into survey
questions to be asked of a national sample. The
principal survey for the purposes of this paper was
conducted by telephone from 9 March to 22 June
2002 on a random sample of 705 voting age citizens
nationwide (see the online appendix). The online
appendix illustrates that the sample we obtained was
similar to the national population in terms of marital
status, sex, and race, while, like most telephone
surveys, slightly underrepresenting less educated and
younger individuals. We also compare turnout and
partisanship in our sample to another random large
sample survey of individuals from the 2000 election,
the American National Election Survey (ANES). Again,
we see only minor differences.3
The survey instrument consisted of two main
sections. Initially, we gauged respondents’ general
thoughts and feelings about political advertising,
based on their level of agreement with statements
taken almost verbatim from the focus groups. We
also used an open-ended question format to learn, in
the respondents’ own words, what makes a political
ad positive and what makes a political ad negative.
Our goal was to assess the role of partisanship in
responses to political advertising while controlling for
broader perceptions and attitudes toward campaign
ads. To the extent that these perceptions and atti-
tudes are themselves influenced by partisanship, our
analysis is a conservative gauge of the totality of
partisan effects.
In the second part of our survey we looked in
detail at perceptions of fairness and partisanship. We
began by replicating the questions used by Freedman
and Lawton (2000), asking whether it is fair or unfair
for candidates to criticize an opponent in campaign
ads that address various issue positions, matters of
character, and other candidate constructs. To limit
respondent fatigue we restricted these questions to five
topics, randomly ordered, rather than the twelve that
Freedman and Lawton used. For the sake of compara-
bility we not only covered issue– and character-based
charges, but also made sure to include the topics that
3As with ANES surveys, more respondents claim to have voted
than in the population.
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had produced wide variation in perceptions of fairness
in the Freedman and Lawton study.
By referring to criticisms of ‘‘candidates’’ in the
abstract, our questions at this stage adopted the
approach of previous research, albeit with a national
rather than a state (Freedman and Lawton 2000) or
regional (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1989) sam-
ple. To gauge the role of partisanship in the next stage
of questioning, we injected partisanship into candi-
dates’ criticisms by providing some specific examples
of these same criticisms of the opponent made by the
presidential candidates and their supporters during
the 2000 election. We also randomized the order in
which we asked these questions. We did not inform
respondents that they were specific examples of the
same charges whose fairness they had previously been
asked to assess.
Results
Our respondents’ perceptions of an ad’s fairness
varied dramatically according to the type of criticism
and partisanship (see the online appendix). As in
previous studies, perceptions divided neatly along
two dimensions with issue-based criticism appraised
as much fairer than criticism about a candidate’s
personal life. Beyond confirming earlier findings,
however, we asked how perceptions of fairness
offered in response to hypothetical criticism com-
pared to voters’ evaluations of actual ad claims. In
real campaigns, identifiable candidates of known
partisanship aim criticisms at an often equally known
opponent with a different partisan affiliation. Even
when the sponsorship of an ad is obscured, its target
generally is not. Charges made in the context of an
election may be expected to convey meanings that are
not at all abstract for a voter.
To move beyond assessments of criticisms-in-
the-abstract, we asked respondents about the fairness
of specific charges from the George W. Bush and Al
Gore campaigns in the 2000 presidential election.
These criticisms were taken directly from each candi-
date’s advertising or from newspaper stories during
the election (see the online appendix).4 We made the
specific charges as parallel as possible. Thus, the
example of ‘‘criticizing an opponent for taking con-
tributions from special interests,’’ referred to a charge
that Gore made about Bush’s ties to big oil and to a
claim that Bush had made about Gore being beholden
to trial lawyers. Claims concerning ‘‘criticizing the
behavior of an opponent’s family members’’ referred
to underage drinking by the candidate’s daughter(s).5
Substituting an actual campaign claim for a
hypothetical criticism produced a dramatic change,
a finding that emerged for issue-based as well as
character-centered criticisms (see the online appen-
dix). For example, more than one-third of respond-
ents switched from believing some of the issue-based
charges were fair (unfair) in the abstract to saying
that specific charges were unfair (fair). Why do voters’
perceptions of the fairness of an ad depend on whether
they are asked to evaluate a claim about a hypothet-
ical candidate or an actual criticism leveled against
a real candidate during a specific campaign? The
conventional wisdom suggests that partisanship is not
the answer, based on findings that voters exhibiting
an affinity for politics, including identification with
either major party, tolerate negative advertising, at
least when it comes to ads evaluated in the abstract.
We theorize, in contrast, that in an actual campaign,
partisanship will color perceptions of the fairness of
an advertising claim and that the effects of the re-
sulting evaluations of an ad’s fairness are more com-
plex than the conventional wisdom holds. To test our
theory that partisanship influences perceptions we
ran a series of logit models comparing the variables
that affected perceptions in the abstract to those
driving perceptions of the specific examples, includ-
ing all of the variables that Freedman and Lawton[0]
and Johnson-Cartee and Copeland indicate are im-
portant influences. In addition, we then examined
the claim that partisans are aloof to the effects of
their evaluations of advertising, that they will vote
regardless.
Following the literature, the explanatory variables
consisted of six main groups. First, we controlled for the
impact of general attitudes toward political advertising,
using data from our survey to examine whether simply
having a distaste (or liking) for political advertising
drives perceptions of fairness more than partisanship.
4Newspaper stories, from which we drew examples of personal
criticism, did not necessarily involve explicit criticism by the
opponent. For example, the Gore campaign made no explicit
mention of Bush’s daughters’ underage drinking. Interviewers in
our survey recorded comments made by respondents during the
survey; none questioned whether these were criticisms that had
actually been leveled by the candidates in 2000. Excluding
perceptions of these criticisms from our analysis makes no
difference to the results.
5When our respondents were surveyed, George W. Bush’s job
approval was above 70% in CNN/Gallup and USA Today polls. It
was also high in our sample, at 83%, although there were large
differences between Democrats and Republicans. Such high
approval could have affected our results if respondents deemed
criticism of Bush generally unfair. We found no effects of this
kind.
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We included variables that measure ‘‘positive thoughts
and feelings’’ and ‘‘negative thoughts and feelings about
political advertising’’ based on the extent of our re-
spondents’ agreement with a series of statements regard-
ing thoughts and feelings about political advertising6
(the online appendix shows these and all other mea-
sures.) We also added a dummy variable based on
answers to an open-ended question about how re-
spondents define negative advertising. Unlike positive
advertising, where definitions ranged widely, 55% of
our sample spontaneously defined negative advertising
very simply, as criticizing an opponent.7 If there is an
association between believing an ad is negative and
deeming it to be unfair, respondents who defined neg-
ative advertising in this way as mere critique should be
more likely to have viewed the examples of criticism in
our survey as unfair.
Second, we examined indicators of ‘‘views of
government’’ because, beyond attacking specific can-
didates, the undercurrent of much negative advertis-
ing is cynicism about government (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1995). Citizens who view government pos-
itively may also perceive the kinds of charges that are
the common currency of negative political advertis-
ing to be among the most unfair. Our indicators of
views of government were perceptions of external
efficacy and trust in the federal government. The
third group of variables captured individual differ-
ences in political expertise, measured by political
knowledge and, because readers of newspapers tend
to be more politically engaged (Chang and Krosnick
2003), by frequency of newspaper readership. We
hypothesized that political expertise fosters greater
tolerance of negative advertising, meaning that voters
with more expertise should be generally more likely
to see criticism as fair (Kahn and Kenney 1999).
Fourth, we included measures of media use, paying
particular attention to local news viewership because
most political advertising airs during local news
(Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004). We con-
trolled for variance in exposure to political advertis-
ing and for the possibility that consumption of local
news sensitizes citizens to campaign criticism (Allen
et al. 2007). The fifth category of variables encom-
passed key psychological and demographic variables
related to political behavior and perception: approval
of President Bush, generational cohort, sex, and race
(Miller and Shanks 1996).8 Finally, in the sixth
category, we included dummy variables for party
identification (for Republicans and Independents),
with Democratic identifiers as the reference variable
(coded from the standard ANES question format) to
gauge the influence of partisanship.
If identifying with a major party leads to a higher
threshold for what constitutes fair, relevant, and legit-
imate criticism in advertising, we should see a consis-
tently lower tolerance for criticism among Independents
relative to their partisan peers for both abstract and
specific criticisms. If partisans engage in motivated
processing when evaluating such criticisms, however,
we should find that their perceptions of claims made
about an actual candidate differ from their views of
criticism described hypothetically. We do not expect
partisanship to affect perceptions of fairness in the ab-
stract; we do anticipate differences in the way Demo-
crats and Republicans evaluate the fairness of the
specific criticisms leveled against George W. Bush and
Al Gore in actual campaign ads. The coefficient on
the Republican dummy variable should therefore be
negative and statistically significant when the criti-
cism refers to Bush and positive and statistically sig-
nificant for criticisms of Gore.
All variables were coded from zero to one in
order to ease interpretation. In Table 1 we display the
results for the key variables of interest.9 In general
our models indicate that perceptions of fairness in
advertising are idiosyncratic, particularly when the
charges therein are personal. The fit of some of the
models is weak. They tend to explain much more of
the variance in perceptions for issue-related charges
than for personally directed charges (where there is
also less variance to explain). We briefly comment
first on key variables other than partisanship.
Political knowledge is consistently important to
perceptions in the abstract, and also has some effect
on perceptions of specific criticisms, particularly for
those charges that are unrelated to a candidate’s
personal life. Indeed, political knowledge behaves as
conventional wisdom indicates identifying with a
major party might: citizens who know more about
politics have a greater tendency to perceive negative
6Principal components factor analysis, with an oblique rotation,
of the responses to these statements indicated these two, positive
and negative, factors.
7For 63% of respondents, this was also the full extent of their
definition.
8We tested several plausible relationships between age and
perceptions of fairness. Specifying the effect of age in years as
linear in our models produced a mixture of statistically signifi-
cant findings that were difficult to interpret. Adding a quadratic
term for age in years did not help. We theorized that perhaps we
were capturing generational effects. With the dummy variables
for generations shown in Table 1 the relationship became clearer.
These definitions were taken from Bennett and Bennett (1990).
9Full results are available from the authors upon request.
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charges as fair. Such a finding suggests that a greater
understanding or familiarity with politics results in
more allowance for the roughness of politics. As a
corollary one may expect those most likely to see
criticism of candidates as illegitimate or unfair to be
the least engaged with politics. Yet we see no effect of
this kind when engagement is represented by news-
paper readership. Several other potential relation-
ships also do not emerge. The three indicators of
attitudes toward political advertising failed to influ-
ence perceptions of fairness. Similarly, trust in
government, which was a factor in two of the models
for which the charges were presented to the respond-
ents in the abstract, had no effect when the charges
were leveled at George W. Bush and Al Gore. Like-
wise external efficacy failed to have an impact. In
short, views of government have scant influence on
assessments of a particular ad’s legitimacy.10 Thus the
most consistent influence on perceptions of fairness in
advertising, in terms of statistical significance and
direction, is political knowledge. This result echoes
previous findings (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995;
Freedman and Lawton 2000; Kahn and Kenney
1999): all else equal, political expertise is associated
with a more generous standard of what constitutes fair
criticism of a candidate. But what of partisanship?
The results in Table 1 confirm our theory that the
relationship between partisanship and perceptions of
fairness is robust and contingent on the party of the
candidate.11 Unlike political knowledge, partisanship
is not consistently more likely to result in viewing the
criticisms of advertising as fair; partisans, even con-
trolling for political knowledge, do not display higher
thresholds in their judgments of fairness. When the
criticism is about Bush, Republican identifiers are
consistently less likely to judge it as fair than Demo-
cratic identifiers; if the charges relate to Gore, Repub-
licans are more likely to view them as fair and
legitimate than Democrats. In only one instance did
partisanship fail to affect the evaluation of an actual ad
claim; criticism of a candidate’s family members
universally crossed the line.12,13 As predicted, partisan-
ship has no impact on perceptions of fairness in the
abstract, but is crucial to understanding voters’ per-
ceptions of actual ads.
Figure 1 provides illustrative simulations for
‘‘criticizing an opponent for talking one way and
voting another,’’ and for ‘‘criticizing an opponent for
taking campaign contributions from certain special
interests,’’ first taken in the abstract, followed by the
specific cases of Bush or Gore. The figure shows the
probability of seeing a charge as legitimate in each
case. All variables in the model are set at their mean
(or mode for categorical variables) while party
identification is allowed to vary.
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates the effects of
partisanship and is indicative of active, motivated
processing of the advertising claims by partisans. For
example, when the charge is ‘‘talking one way and
voting another,’’ Independents are least likely to see
the criticism as legitimate when it is stated in the
abstract. Yet when respondents are presented with
specific examples of such charges from the 2000
presidential election, the relative position of partisan
groupings changes. Republicans become the least
likely to view this criticism of President Bush as
legitimate and Democrats the most likely, while
Republicans are the most likely to call the criticism
fair when it is of Al Gore, with Democrats becoming
the least likely to say criticism of Gore is fair. For the
issue of taking campaign contributions from special
interests the patterns are similar.
Conclusions about the effects of negative adver-
tising based only on perceptions of fairness in the
abstract must be reconsidered. The evaluations of
criticisms against a hypothetical candidate, which
may be made on the basis of principles of fairness,
do not translate into standards applied universally
when the identities of candidates are known. When
10We also found few effects for our measure of exposure to
political advertising. We checked the robustness of this finding
using our 2004 data for which, unlike our earlier survey, we knew
the television market in which each respondent resided. Using
CMAG data for 2004 on presidential advertising in each
respondent’s market we ran models of perceptions of fairness
with exposure to advertising as an independent variable oper-
ationalized in a variety of ways. In each series of models, the
influence of exposure to advertising was overwhelmingly statisti-
cally insignificant. In short, perceptions of fairness in advertising
do not appear to be contingent on exposure.
11We specified the models based on our reading of the most
important variables in the literature, but we also checked the
robustness of the results by adding variables for internal efficacy,
education, length of residence in the community, living in the South,
living in a border state, and income (variables in Rosenstone and
Hansen’s (1993) model of turnout in presidential elections). They
have a negligible impact on the size and statistical significance of
the effects of partisanship.
12Our theory implies that strong partisans may be especially
prone to ‘‘motivated processing.’’ To replicate previous research
in the field (and in view of our sample size), we specify
partisanship in three broad categories. In additional analysis,
we separated respondents into strong, weak, and leaning parti-
sans, finding that strong partisans are likely to see criticism of
their own candidate as particularly unfair and of claims against
his opponent as particularly fair.
13We use one-tailed tests in Table 1 because our hypotheses
regarding partisanship are directional. With two-tailed tests, four
of the eleven statistically significant coefficients in Table 1 would
have p values greater than .05 but less than .10.
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specified candidates are the objects of evaluation,
information processing based on principles of fair-
ness gives way to processing and evaluations moti-
vated by partisanship. While political knowledge is
generally associated with more generous standards of
legitimacy in abstract and specific examples, ante-
cedent partisan loyalties substantially colored percep-
tions of the fairness of the specific charges against
George W. Bush and Al Gore. Standards of fairness
are not immutable principles that are even-handedly
applied. Partisans, regardless of political acumen, do
not apply more generous standards of fairness to ad
claims, but instead apply whatever standards they
hold asymmetrically.
Consistent with a theory of motivated processing,
partisans’ perceptions of fairness are contingent on
the party that a candidate represents. How do
perceptions of fairness in political advertising affect
turnout? Although the timing of our survey limits the
inferences we may make (it took place more than a
year after the 2000 election), we can examine the
relationship between perceptions of fairness in our
sample and reported turnout. In addition, we repli-
cated the survey in October 2004 (i.e., during the
2004 election campaign), with reference to candidates
George W. Bush and John Kerry, obtaining results
that were substantively the same, further supporting
our findings related to Election 2000. Where appro-
priate, we discuss the results in this article. (For
details of the survey and the relationship between
fairness and turnout, see the online appendix.)
Turning to the data pertaining to the 2000
election, we note that respondents’ recall of their
behavior may be inaccurate. To check how faulty
their recollections might have been we looked at the
ANES panel surveys from 1956 to 1960 and from
1972 to 1976. Respondents were asked whether they
had voted four years earlier. A total of roughly 10%
of respondents in each panel misreported their behav-
ior. That 90% of respondents seem able to recall
correctly whether they had voted four years earlier
allayed our concern that the relationships we sought to
examine could be confounded by faulty recall of voting
behavior from 15 to 18 months earlier.14
To examine hypotheses suggested by findings
that perceptions of fairness of advertising mediate
the individual propensity to vote and that partisans
are less affected than Independents by mudslinging
and unfairness (Freedman and Lawton 2000; Kahn
and Kenney 1999), we model an individual’s proba-
bility of having voted in 2000 as a function of his
or her attitudes toward advertising, perceptions of
fairness in advertising, and partisanship. We control
for political knowledge, gauging the effects of the
attitudes and perceptions of interest independently
of this highly influential variable. If partisanship mod-
erates how perceptions of ad fairness affect turnout,
making partisans less responsive to variation in per-
ceptions of fairness, we would expect no differences be-
tween Republicans and Democrats, and a significantly
reduced impact of perceptions of fairness on partisans
compared to Independents. However, if partisans are
motivated processors, predisposed to judge charges
against their own candidate as unfair, then the more
they consider the charges against their candidate to be
fair, the less likely they should be to vote. This
hypothesis implies that partisan turnout is more
FIGURE 1 Variation in Perceptions of Fairness of
‘‘Criticizing an Opponent for Talking
One Way and Voting Another’’ By
Partisanship
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14The ANES panels do not preclude the possibility that reported
voting behavior at the time of the first survey is inaccurate but we
have no way of gauging this conjecture, and there is more error in
recalling for whom one voted than whether or not one voted.
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affected by perceptions of fairness than Independent
turnout and that this effect is contingent on which
candidate is the subject of an advertising claim.
We test the alternatives in Table 2. We created
two identically operationalized, but separate, indexes
of fairness based on respondents’ evaluations of the
five charges against George W. Bush and Al Gore. We
examine our claims regarding greater and asymmet-
rical effects for partisans through interactions
between each of these indexes and partisan identi-
fication, and Wald tests of the differences between
these coefficients.15 The interaction term, for example
TABLE 2 Logit Model of the Relationship Between Perceptions of Fairness and Turnout
Independent Variable
Negative thoughts and feelings about advertising .75 (.56)
Positive thoughts and feelings about advertising .37 (.52)
Negative advertising is criticism of an opponent .13 (.22)
Political knowledge 2.09 (.40)**
Republican .54 (.62)
Independent 2.60 (.61)
Perceptions of fairness of charges against
George W. Bush
1.75 (1.03)*
Perceptions of fairness of charges against Al Gore 22.77 (1.17)**
Perceptions of fairness of charges against George
W. Bush x Republican identifier
25.62 (1.61)**
Perceptions of fairness of charges against Al Gore x
Republican identifier
4.71 (1.74)**
Perceptions of fairness of charges against George
W. Bush x Independent identifier
22.40 (1.85)
Perceptions of fairness of charges against Al Gore x
Independent identifier
3.49 (1.97)*
Constant 2.21 (.61)
N 638
Pseudo R2 .11
Prob. . Chi2 .00
Wald Tests of the Differences in Coefficients
Difference between . . .
Democratic
identifier and
Republican
identifier
Republican
identifier and
Independent
identifier
Democratic
identifier and
Independent
identifier
Test of difference in coefficients for . . .
Perceptions of fairness of charges against
George W. Bush
chi2 5 9.35
p 5 .00#
chi2 5 2.76
p 5 .10
chi2 5 2.59
p 5 .11
Perceptions of fairness of charges against Al Gore chi2 5 7.82
p 5 .01
chi2 5 .36
p 5 .55
chi2 5 4.91
p 5 .03
Difference between . . .
Democratic
identifier
Republican
identifier
Independent
identifier
Test of difference in coefficients for . . .
Perceptions of fairness of charges against
George W. Bush AND Perceptions of fairness
of charges against Al Gore
chi2 5 4.92
p 5 .03
chi2 5 11.34
p 5 .00
chi2 5 2.73
p 5 .10
#All p’s for the Wald tests are two-tailed
15We also examined whether there was an effect of abstract
perceptions of fairness, either on its own or as an effect that was
moderated by partisanship; we found neither.
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Perceptions of fairness of charges against George W.
Bush x Republican identifier in Table 2, only shows
whether perceptions of fairness of criticism of George
W. Bush have a different effect on the turnout of
Republican identifiers than on Democrats and
Independents; Wald tests show the statistical signifi-
cance of the difference between Republicans and
Democrats and for differences in the effects of
perceptions of fairness of criticism of George W.
Bush and Al Gore on the turnout of Republicans,
Democrats, and Independents, all of which are
relevant to our theory.
The coefficients in Table 2 show that perceptions
of fairness among partisans have a dramatic effect on
reported turnout. The more partisans evaluated the
charges against their own candidate as fair, the less
likely they were to have voted; the more they
evaluated the charges against the opposing candidate
as fair the more likely they were to have voted. For
Democrats the effects are captured by the variables
Perceptions of fairness of charges against George W.
Bush and Perceptions of fairness of charges against Al
Gore. Wald tests demonstrate that these differences
are robust: perceiving charges against Al Gore as fair
has an impact on the turnout of Democrats that is
statistically significantly different, and opposite in
sign, from the impact such perceptions have on
Republicans. The same is true for charges against
George W. Bush, with the direction of effects re-
versed. The relationship between perceiving charges
against Al Gore as fair but not characterizing crit-
icism of George W. Bush as fair is statistically sig-
nificant for Democratic identifiers and Republican
identifiers alike, and the two groups are polarized in
their perceptions. Among Independents, as expected,
many of the relationships do not reach conventional
levels of statistical significance.
The effects shown in Table 2 are also slightly
stronger for the candidate of the party with which an
individual identifies than for his opponent. The flip
side is that perceiving the charges made against one’s
own candidate as unfair is associated with a boost in
the turnout of partisans, while the same perception
about the charges made by one’s candidate against
the opponent is associated with a reduction in the
turnout of partisans. Partisans are not less responsive
to the tone of advertising than Independents. In fact,
they are more so—and the direction of their respon-
siveness is driven by partisanship.
Figure 2 illustrates these results by simulating the
probability of voting among partisans and Independ-
ents, given variance in perceptions of the fairness of
criticisms of candidates Bush and Gore. The simu-
lations are based on Table 2, with all other variables
set at their mean (or mode for categorical variables).
The upper chart holds perceptions of fairness of
criticism of Gore at its mean and allows perceptions
of fairness of criticism of Bush to vary one standard
deviation below or above its mean. The lower chart
does the same for Gore, holding perceptions of
charges made against Bush at its mean. Figure 2
clearly demonstrates the extent to which partisans are
affected by the content that is typical of negative
advertising. Whereas the probability of Independents
voting is hardly affected by perceptions of fairness
(the lines are essentially flat) perceptions of fairness
greatly influence propensity to vote as the steep slope
of the line shows.
Although ANES panel surveys suggest that recall
of whether or not one voted in an election is largely
accurate, our findings for turnout may be questioned
since the survey took place more than a year after the
2000 election. We therefore replicated the 2002 study
FIGURE 2 Simulations of How Perceptions of
Fairness Affect Turnout
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on a national sample of 720 individuals in October
2004, avoiding the problems of timing and recall.16
The examples in 2004 were of criticisms from the
George W. Bush and John Kerry campaigns.17 The
results were substantively very similar (see the online
appendix). For example, among Democratic identi-
fiers, the more they perceived the criticisms of George
W. Bush to be fair, the more certain they said they
were to vote; to the extent that they saw criticism of
their own candidate, John Kerry, as fair, however,
they reported themselves as being less certain of
voting. For Republicans the relationships were re-
versed.18 In 2004, Independents looked even less like
motivated processors than they had in the first
survey, behaving more consistently with our theory.
Our data do not permit us to assert confidently
whether perceptions of fairness and their varying
effect on partisans and independents regularly affect
turnout. We have demonstrated, however, that, all else
equal, partisans are more likely to view charges leveled
against their candidate as unfair. In addition, the more
often partisans respond habitually by viewing criticism
of the opposing candidate as legitimate, the more
likely they are to be mobilized. Thus in many
campaigns, partisans will be mobilized by negative
advertising (i.e., Republicans and Democrats will be at
the high points of Figure 2). Such an effect only
augments the mobilizing force of negative advertising,
if indeed such negativity is arresting, anxiety inducing,
and informative. Thus, our results suggest a simple
process may be at work in which the psychological
tendency to view in opposite ways negative claims
against a favored candidate and those aimed at an
opponent may mobilize partisans selectively.
Although there is a bias against accepting
criticism of one’s own candidate, we find that when
these criticisms do penetrate and seem to fit, they
are demobilizing. This result bears out another
aspect of motivated processing theory, which argues
that a respondent’s understanding of reality condi-
tions his or her ability to draw a given conclusion
(confirmatory or not) from a given body of informa-
tion; the confirmation bias of motivated processing is
constrained by a respondent’s more fundamental
conception of ‘‘reality’’ (Kunda 1999). Similarly,
attacks by one’s own candidate that are perceived as
unfair are also demobilizing. Thus in campaigns
where one candidate’s negative advertising is partic-
ularly effective or one candidate’s advertising is
widely perceived as unfair we may see one set of
partisans turning out to vote in higher numbers while
another is more likely to stay at home. There may be
little net effect of exposure to advertising on turnout,
yet the composition of the voting electorate will be
altered. Finally, campaigns where partisans from both
parties are repelled by the attacks of their candidates
or convinced by the attacks of their opponent will see
lower turnout among partisans.
A candidate whose advertising campaign was
perceived as unfair by his or her own partisans and
those of the other party would pay a heavy price,
according to these data, demobilizing supporters and
mobilizing those of the opponent. (See the focus
group comments reported earlier, particularly those
of Duane and of Dick, a Grams supporter whose
support was called into question by Grams’s negative
ads.) Of course, most campaigns try to avoid being
doubly penalized by alienating their own partisans as
well as their opponents’ with attacks that both view as
unfair; going negative, our data show, can be a high
risk strategy with the potential for great costs or
benefits, and very little between these extremes. If a
candidate can identify a course of attack that his or
her own partisans agree is fair and to which the
opposition similarly gives credence, however, our
16Random digit dialing was used to recruit 510 respondents
nationally. We also contacted as many of the respondents from
the 2002 survey as possible and were able to interview 210. It
makes no difference to the substance of the analysis if we exclude
the panel respondents. For more details on this survey, see the
online appendix.
17To reflect the context of the 2004 election, our questions
covered some new categories of criticism, and left out a few used
in 2002. If we exclude the new categories and create an index of
perceptions of fairness based only on the categories used in 2002,
the direction and statistical significance of the coefficients as well
as the results of the Wald tests are unchanged.
18This result begs the question of whether perceptions of message
fairness in advertising are merely a proxy for something more
general, such as confidence in the candidate. Was Kerry, in other
words, a ‘‘weak’’ candidate? Fortunately the 2004 survey contained
an experiment that bears on the measure of fairness. We presented
one-half of the sample with an example of criticism of John Kerry’s
service in Vietnam and of criticism of George W. Bush for misleading
the nation regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The other
half of the sample was presented with the same criticisms but with the
addition of countervailing arguments, for instance that independent
organizations rejected the claims about Kerry’s Purple Hearts. We
found that the additional information had a dramatic effect on
partisan perceptions of the fairness of these charges. For example,
67% of Republican identifiers perceived criticism of Kerry’s service
in Vietnam as fair in the absence of countervailing information, but
only 39% saw it as fair after receiving additional information.
Conversely, Democratic perceptions of this criticism barely shifted.
Such change (or stability) says less about perceptions of a given
candidate than it signifies about a genuine shift in voters’ perceptions
of the fairness of a campaign ad claim. Of course, there is almost
certainly interplay between advertising campaigns and confidence in
a candidate; to the extent that criticism of a candidate resonates with
the electorate (perhaps because the candidate fails to counterattack
or the media echoes the criticism, giving it legitimacy, as with the
1988 Dukakis campaign), it may undermine confidence in the
candidate.
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data suggest that going negative may be a winning
strategy.19
Conclusion
The importance of research on ad communications in
election campaigns is put in perspective by three
facts: (1) Typically, presidential and state-wide cam-
paigns spend the majority of their funds on television
ads. (2) Local television news is the prime news
source of election information, images, and com-
mentary for the mass public—and the primary site of
campaign advertising (Freedman, Franz, and Gold-
stein 2004). (3) At the nexus of political advertising
and local election news coverage, ads often over-
whelm news stories in terms of viewer exposure (e.g.,
Kaplan, Goldstein, and Hale 2005).
We have found that partisanship shapes re-
sponses to negative advertising; we argue that con-
ventional wisdom does not have the process quite
right. Partisanship does not lead individuals to ignore
negative ads, nor does it result in higher thresholds of
fairness, leaving partisans unaffected by ad content.
Instead, we find strong support for the hypothesis
that partisans are motivated processors of informa-
tion; they respond habitually, according to their
partisan bias—but with a crucial exception under
an important condition. Partisans are predisposed
to see charges against their favored candidate as
unfounded, and when confronted with such charges,
they are inclined to counter them and vote as ex-
pected. If they recognize a charge against their candi-
date as potentially fair, or if their party’s candidate
does something that crosses the line into stark mud-
slinging, however, partisans will question their exist-
ing voting habits, activating doubts about their
preferred candidate. Abandoning a habit may not
result in a new preference for the opposing candidate,
but it may be enough to cause even an ardent par-
tisan to stay away from the polls. We have demon-
strated these effects in two surveys and two election
contexts. (See the online appendix for 2004 results.)
An important task remains: identifying and analyzing
the factors that lead partisans to accept the potential
validity of negative charges against their own party’s
candidate. Understanding why partisans sometimes
do not reject information at odds with their beliefs
will undoubtedly illuminate the more usual response
of rejecting aversive information in processes leading
to confirmation bias.
Reflecting on electoral processes broadly, our
findings raise questions about the sources of infor-
mation on which evaluations of an ad’s legitimacy
may be based. Our data show how negative ads
against a partisan’s initially preferred candidate that
are perceived to be fair may raise demobilizing
doubts, resulting in a change in the composition of
the voting electorate. Is it also the case that partisans
are likely to abandon their default behavioral predis-
positions when the campaign criticism or behavior
arousing the initial anxiety response also seems to be
taking hold in the electorate—or is prevalent in the
media? Are perceptions of fairness also related to the
climate of opinion about the subject of an ad claim,
or even an ad itself? What role may election news
coverage play in shaping this climate? Research on
political advertising effects has considered either the
tone of the campaign or the characteristics of
campaign news coverage, but seldom expressly tied
these two exogenous influences together. It makes
sense to think that negative campaign claims may be
reinforced (even amplified) or diminished (perhaps
dispelled) according to the climate of opinion shaped
by such news coverage (e.g., see Pomper 2001, 59, 62).
We speculate that news coverage of the presidential
candidates may influence whether negative ad claims
are deemed to be fair and whether partisans who
perceive them as legitimate are ultimately prompted
to reconsider their vote or shun the voting booth
altogether. Such possibilities also imply that the
impact of campaign advertising is not wholly con-
tingent upon exposure, as the Daisy Girl ad taught
us more than 40 years ago. Mediated perceptions of
ads and ad campaigns among partisans are equally,
or, possibly, more consequential than mere expo-
sure. All criticisms are apparently not equal; what
is good for the goose may not be good for the
gander.
19The specification of our turnout model is designed to obtain a
clear look at the effects of fairness, controlling for the key
variables in Table 1, such as political knowledge, and also for
general attitudes toward advertising. Alternatively, we could
include more independent variables, potentially adding multi-
collinearity and inefficiency to the model estimates, but also
shedding some light on the robustness of relationships. In
additional analysis we therefore added variables for internal
and external efficacy, trust in the federal government, frequency
of reading a newspaper, frequency of watching local television
news, sex, race, generation, approval of the president, marital
status, education, living in a southern state, and living in a border
state (as defined by Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). We see some
weakening of relationships, most clearly for perceptions of
fairness of criticism of Al Gore on the turnout of Democratic
identifiers. Yet the overall picture of statistically significant,
distinct effects of perceptions of fair criticism on turnout for
the two groups of partisans (depending on the target of
criticism), remained.
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